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Turning the Page: The Demise of the 
“Queenan Doctrine” Requiring the Adoption 
of a Foreclosure Valuation Methodology in 
Chapter 11 Cases 
Harrison Denman* 
This Article traces the evolution of the default standard applied by 
bankruptcy courts to valuing a secured lender’s collateral under 
section 506(a) for purposes of determining whether a “diminution 
in value” has occurred sufficient to trigger the need for adequate 
protection. Historically, bankruptcy courts applied a standard 
premised on the scholarship of Judge Queenan of the Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Massachusetts. That standard called for, 
absent contractual language to the contrary, application of a 
foreclosure valuation methodology regardless of the actual or 
anticipated use of such collateral during the chapter 11 cases. In 
recent years, there has been a trend away from Judge Queenan’s 
rigid methodology in favor of a more flexible standard that takes 
its cue from the particular facts relating to the collateral’s use in 
each chapter 11 case—leading, typically, to the application of a 
fair market value standard. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases with large capital structures frequently 
feature a common form of dispute—a valuation fight between secured 
creditors and unsecured creditors over the appropriate value of a secured 
creditor’s collateral. The reason for this dispute is fundamental to Chapter 
11—any value not attributed to a secured creditor’s collateral will usually 
be attributed to unencumbered assets and thereby be available for pro rata 
distribution to an estate’s general unsecured creditors. 
Section 506(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code governs these disputes over 
the valuation of a secured creditor’s collateral. That section provides: 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on 
property in which the estate has an interest, or that is 
subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured 
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest 
in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of 
the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such 
creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less 
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall 
be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and 
of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and 
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use 
or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.1 
                                                                                                             
1 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 
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The valuation under section 506(a) can be undertaken by the court in 
any of various contexts. When the valuation is undertaken to determine 
whether a secured creditor’s collateral has diminished in value over the 
course of a Chapter 11 case, it implicates the bankruptcy concept of 
adequate protection. Adequate protection is not defined by the Bankruptcy 
Code. Generally speaking, the concept is meant to conform the various 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code with the preservation of a secured 
creditor’s private property rights enshrined in the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.2 
Three different sections of the Bankruptcy Code require that a secured 
creditor’s interest in an asset of the debtor be “adequately protected” 
during the debtor’s Chapter 11 cases. First, section 362(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay and 
permit a secured creditor to take action against its collateral, to the extent 
the secured creditor demonstrates that its interest in that collateral is not 
adequately protected.3 Second, section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code 
requires that a secured creditor receive adequate protection of its interest 
in an asset in connection with the debtor’s use, sale or lease of the asset 
during the Chapter 11 case.4 Third, section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code 
permits a bankruptcy court to approve post-petition financing that primes 
the lien of a pre-petition secured creditor to the extent that the pre-petition 
secured creditor receives adequate protection of its interest in that 
property.5 Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, in turn, specifies three 
                                                                                                             
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“ . . . nor shall any person be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”); see also Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 
(1940); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 339 (1977) (“The concept is derived from the fifth 
amendment protection of property interests.”). 
3 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (“On request of a party in interest . . . the court shall grant relief 
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, 
annulling, modifying or conditioning such stay—(1) for cause, including the lack of 
adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.”). 
4 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[O]n request of an entity that has an interest in property . . . 
proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, 
shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate 
protection of such interest.”). 
5 11 U.S.C. § 364 (“The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining 
of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate 
that is subject to a lien only if—(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder 
of the lien on the property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to 
be granted.”). 
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forms of adequate protection that may be provided to a secured creditor to 
satisfy sections 362(d), 363(e), or 364.6 
As a matter of practice, such adequate protection rights may be 
memorialized in a court order at the outset of a bankruptcy case approving 
the debtor’s use of cash collateral. At the outset of a Chapter 11 case, a 
debtor would seek court approval to use its cash which, under most 
circumstances, would constitute collateral of its secured lenders. Such 
court orders will typically condition the continued use of such cash 
collateral on the continued adequate protection of the secured lenders’ 
interests in such cash to the extent of any subsequent diminution in value. 
Such court orders could in theory memorialize an agreement between the 
parties of the proper valuation standard to be used in the event of any 
subsequent dispute over these adequate protection rights. There is no 
reason to think that any such agreement would not be respected by a 
bankruptcy court in the event of a subsequent valuation dispute. 
That said, absent the memorialization of such a standard in a cash 
collateral order, bankruptcy courts, historically, have calculated such a 
diminution in value using one of two different valuation methodologies. 
Some bankruptcy courts favored using a fair market valuation 
methodology for calculating adequate protection of a secured creditor’s 
interest in an asset that was retained and used by a debtor. These 
bankruptcy courts concluded that the actual fate of the asset dictated the 
use of fair market valuation methodology, given that the second sentence 
of section 506(a) emphasizes the “proposed disposition or use” of the asset 
to be valued.7 Other bankruptcy courts, however, favored using a 
foreclosure valuation methodology for calculating adequate protection of 
a secured creditor’s interest in an asset, even where that asset was retained 
and used by a debtor. Relying on the scholarship of the former Chief Judge 
Queenan of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, these bankruptcy courts concluded that the first sentence 
of section 506(a), which emphasized the contractual “interest” of the 
creditor in the asset to be valued, required the default application of a 
foreclosure value methodology.8 
The search for a particular valuation methodology in the absence of 
governing language one way or the other necessarily has profound but 
divergent consequences for creditor recoveries in a Chapter 11 proceeding. 
                                                                                                             
6 11 U.S.C. § 361 (“When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 
364, of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be 
provided by . . . .”). 
7 In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (emphasis added); 
Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990). 
8 See James F. Queenan, Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 
92 COM. L.J. 18, 30 (1987). 
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A hypothetical foreclosure valuation requires a bankruptcy court to value 
the subject assets as if the secured creditor had foreclosed outside of 
bankruptcy. For this reason, the hypothetical foreclosure valuation 
methodology has been referred to as a valuation of assets “in the hands of 
the secured creditor” or its collateral agent. Adoption of this methodology 
will almost always result in a relatively low valuation of the subject 
assets.9 This is because a secured creditor often lacks the operational 
requirements needed to manage the assets: manpower, expertise, or 
liquidity. And even if the secured creditor is operationally capable of 
managing the assets, it may lack the proper regulatory consents necessary 
to manage regulated assets. 
On the other hand, adoption of a fair market valuation typically results 
in a higher valuation of the secured creditor’s collateral. Measuring the 
value of the assets in the debtor’s hands means that the bankruptcy court 
need not apply a discount to account for the secured creditor’s lack of 
operational abilities or regulatory consents. 
Uncertainty surrounding the appropriate valuation methodology was 
addressed in two recent Supreme Court decisions—Timbers10 and Rash.11 
Although neither case addressed the valuation of collateral under section 
506(a) for adequate protection purposes, each emphasized the “proposed 
disposition or use” language in the second sentence of section 506(a) at 
the expense of the “creditor interest” language in the first sentence of 
section 506(a)—contrary to Judge Queenan’s preferred default 
construction. In the aftermath of Rash, nearly every authority that 
addressed the issue advocated the adoption of a fair market valuation when 
such an asset was actually retained, used, or sold by the debtor.12 
The issue was again litigated in the Residential Capital LLC Chapter 
11 cases, where the bankruptcy court ultimately declined to resurrect the 
Queenan default doctrine of requiring foreclosure valuation of a secured 
creditor’s interest in collateral.13 As a result, the Residential Capital 
decision, discussed infra, may have signaled the end of the practice of 
defaulting to require a foreclosure valuation standard for calculating 
diminution in value when a debtor continues to use or sell the assets at 
issue. 
                                                                                                             
9 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 962 (1997) (8-1 decision). 
10 Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988). 
11 See Rash, supra note 9. 
12 See infra § III (B). 
13 In re Residential Capital, LLC, et al., 501 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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II. THE “QUEENAN DOCTRINE” AS A DEFAULT STANDARD 
Historically, absent specified language one way or the other in the 
governing cash collateral order, some bankruptcy courts applied the 
“hands of the creditor” valuation methodology when valuing collateral for 
adequate protection purposes.14 These cases largely ascribe to a line of 
reasoning which was championed in the 1980s by former Chief Judge of 
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, James F. Queenan. 
Judge Queenan believed that the language in the first sentence of section 
506(a), related to the creditor’s interest, was determinative, and that the 
second sentence (including the “proposed disposition or use” of the assets 
to be valued) had no bearing on the appropriate valuation methodology.15 
In his landmark article, Queenan argued that “with one exception [i.e., 
the proposed sale of the collateral] the selection of a standard for valuation 
of security and mortgage interests in Chapter 11 should be based upon an 
analysis of the rights and obligations of the secured creditor at foreclosure 
rather than upon considerations such as the business prospects of the 
debtor, the value of the collateral apart from the security interest, or the 
purpose of the valuation.”16 Judge Queenan reached his conclusion, in 
part, by focusing on the secured creditor’s interest in collateral rather than 
the purpose of the valuation or the use or disposition of the collateral: “[I]t 
would appear that, with one exception [i.e., the proposed sale of the 
collateral], there is no reason for the purpose of the valuation to be more 
                                                                                                             
14 See In re Case, 115 B.R. 666, 670 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (held, in a chapter 12 plan 
confirmation case, that costs should not be deducted from a fair market valuation when a 
debtor retains collateral but, in dicta, speculating as to the appropriate methodology in the 
adequate protection context: “If we were attempting to value fmHA’s interest in the 
property for adequate protection purposes, the possibility of forced liquidation would be 
assumed and a deduction for selling costs would be logical”); In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 
166 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (evaluating a 507(b) claim related to a piecemeal 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets), aff’d, 182 B.R. 81 (D. Mass. 1995) (affirming on other 
grounds and ignoring the adequate protection issue), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(same); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 159 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (using 
liquidation value when debtor’s business had no prospects of reorganization); In re 
Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 B.R. 177, 183–86 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (declining to 
adopt going concern value for purposes of adequate protection because debtor’s business 
had no prospects of reorganization); In re Rich Int’l Airways, Inc., 50 B.R. 17, 18 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1985) (recounting the legislative history of section 361); La Jolla Mortg. Fund v. 
Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 B.R. 283, 289 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (“[I]n this regard, we 
must evaluate the collateral, being the adequate protection in the hands of the claim holder. 
It is the creditors’ expected costs to liquidate the property that is relevant, not those of the 
debtor.”). 
15 James F. Queenan, Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92 
COM. L.J. 18, 30 (1987) (“We are concerned here not with valuation of the property that 
constitutes collateral but rather, in the words of the statute, with valuation ‘of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.’”). 
16 Id. at 20. 
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than a neutral factor in determination of the valuation standard, as 
compared to the more descriptive statutory phrase ‘proposed disposition 
or use.’”17 
Indeed, many of Judge Queenan’s decisions reflect his approach to 
section 506(a), focusing on the secured creditor’s interest in collateral and 
ignoring the purpose of the valuation and the intended use or disposition 
of the collateral.18 By focusing on the “value of such creditor’s interest in 
property,” and ignoring the second sentence of section 506(a), Judge 
Queenan repeatedly interpreted section 506(a) to require valuation based 
on the creditor’s contract right to foreclose.19 
Judge Queenan recognized that his preferred valuation methodology 
was only appropriate under certain circumstances. For one thing, his 
interpretation of section 506 in the adequate protection context as always 
requiring a foreclosure valuation in the hands of the creditor would not 
apply when the assets to be valued were actually sold.20 In Judge 
Queenan’s words, “where the valuation is made in the context of the sale 
of the debtor’s business as a going concern and the secured claim is to be 
paid from the proceeds[,] . . . it would be ludicrous to adopt another 
                                                                                                             
17 Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 (limiting discussion of the “use or disposition” language to 
actual dispositions, liquidated or otherwise, contemplated in the case); id. at 30 (“We are 
concerned here not with valuation of the property that constitutes collateral but rather, in 
the words of the statute, with valuation ‘of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in 
such property.’”); id. at 33 (stating that decisions applying retail value or going concern 
value in the use context “lose sight of the fact that it is the creditor’s interest in the 
collateral, and not the collateral, that is being valued.”); id. at 36 (“That the debtor is an 
operating business, even one with excellent chances for a successful reorganization, may 
make it less likely that foreclosure will take place, but it has relatively little to do with 
valuation of the secured party’s rights in the collateral.”) 
18 See, e.g., In re Ralar Distributors, Inc., 166 B.R. 3, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) 
(“Because section 506(a) determines the amount of a claim, this reference is clearly not to 
the value of the collateral.”); In re Robbins, 199 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (“The 
phrase ‘the value of such creditor’s interest’ is not equivalent to the value of the 
collateral.”); In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (“Section 
506(a) requires, however, a determination not of the value of the collateral but of ‘the value 
of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .” This interest 
consists primarily of the right to foreclosure, and where the Uniform Commercial Code 
controls, the obligations to do so in a commercially reasonable manner . . . .That a debtor 
appears to be a viable business having going concern value might make foreclosure 
unlikely, but it has previous little to do with valuation of the security interest. A security 
interest is worth what it will bring at foreclosure.”); In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 B.R. 192, 196 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (“Legislative history indicates that the reference in § 506(a) to the 
‘proposed disposition or use’ of the collateral was intended merely to make it clear that a 
valuation in one setting would not be binding upon a valuation in another.’”). 
19 See Ralar, 166 B.R. at 7; In re Tenney Village Co., Inc., 104 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1989) (Queenan, C.J.). 
20 Queenan, supra note 15, at 28. 
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standard or, if an actual sale has been negotiated, to use any value other 
than the agreed price. That seems obvious.”21 
Some bankruptcy courts disagreed with the Queenan approach even 
outside of a sale context. These bankruptcy courts instead held that that 
the second sentence of section 506(a) is determinative for purposes of 
adopting a default valuation methodology. Cases using this approach 
focused on the “use or disposition” of the collateral and held that, where 
the collateral was to be used or retained by the debtor, bankruptcy courts 
should, absent language in an order to the contrary, adopt a fair market 
valuation to determine the extent of that asset’s diminution in value.22 
III. SECTION 506(A) VALUATION AFTER QUEENAN 
This split in authority—between Judge Queenan’s interpretation of 
section 506(a) as requiring foreclosure value even for assets that were 
retained and used, on the one hand, and those courts that instead adopted 
default valuation methodologies based on the actual use or disposition of 
the assets to be valued, on the other hand—was thereafter the subject of 
two Supreme Court cases, Timbers and Rash. 
A. Timbers and Rash 
In Timbers, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted section 506(a) and 
held that “the phrase ‘value of such creditor’s interest’ in section 506(a) 
means ‘the value of the collateral.’”23 This was a direct reproach to the 
statutory interpretation relied upon by Judge Queenan’s minority 
approach, which had relied on the “creditor interest” sentence in section 
506(a) to hold that liquidation value in the hands of the creditor was 
(absent a sale) always the appropriate valuation methodology for an 
                                                                                                             
21 See also In re Tenney Village Co., 104 B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) 
(emphasis added); Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 3-4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (“The words ‘proposed 
disposition’ would also have significance if the Debtor were attempting to sell the property. 
It would then make sense to use fair market value as the base and discount that value to 
reflect whatever the possibility might be that foreclosure would preempt the sale.”). 
22 See, e.g., In re QPL Components, Inc., 20 B.R. 342, 345–46 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(“QPL is an ongoing business. The collateral involved is principally inventory. Applying 
the law as discussed infra, the . . . liquidation value is clearly inappropriate.”); see Bank 
Hapoalim B.M. v. E.L.I., Ltd., 42 B.R. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (affirming bankruptcy 
court’s utilization of an executed sale contract for valuation of sold collateral under section 
506(a) to determine whether the secured creditor was adequately protected); In re Kids 
Stop of Am., Inc., 64 B.R. 397, 401-02 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1986) (construing section 506(a) 
in the adequate protection context, and concluding that secured creditor is entitled to 
adequate protection because the collateral as of petition date was worth the amount actually 
realized from asset sales during the case). 
23 Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988). 
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adequate protection valuation. In the aftermath of Timbers, the First 
Circuit expressly overruled several of Judge Queenan’s pre-Timbers 
decisions and adopted a fair market value methodology when the collateral 
to be valued was proposed to be retained and used by the debtor.24 
After Timbers, but before Rash, two Circuit Courts sought to resolve 
the continuing split in authority regarding valuation methodologies under 
section 506(a). In Winthrop, the First Circuit cited numerous cases on both 
sides of the issue of the appropriate methodology to use when valuing 
collateral proposed to be used or retained by the debtor, holding that the 
appropriate methodology in such instances was fair market value.25 In 
Taffi, the Ninth Circuit similarly considered the issue of whether to always 
deduct hypothetical foreclosure expenses and held that, if the collateral is 
proposed to be used or retained by the debtor, such expenses should not 
be deducted.26 Although Winthrop and Taffi limit the use of liquidation 
value, they cannot be read to mean that liquidation value in the hands of 
the creditor is never appropriate, but rather that, absent governing 
contractual language one way or the other, liquidation value in the hands 
of the creditor should be limited to cases where the debtor proposes to 
surrender the collateral or will be forced to surrender the collateral because 
there is little chance of reorganization.27   
Thereafter, in Rash, the Supreme Court again revisited section 506(a) 
and again rejected Judge Queenan’s approach.28 In Rash, the Supreme 
Court again directly refuted Judge Queenan’s interpretation of section 
506(a), and stated the following: “We do not find in the §506(a) first 
sentence words—‘the creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such 
property’—the foreclosure-value meaning advanced by the Fifth Circuit. 
Even read in isolation, the phrase imparts no valuation standard: A 
direction simply to consider the “value of the creditor’s interest” does not 
expressly reveal how that interest is to be valued.”29 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
24 In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst. for Savings, et al., 50 
F.3d 72, 74-75 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting Judge Queenan’s article and cases); Bank Rhode 
Island v. Pawtuxet Valley Prescription & Surgical Ctr., 386 B.R. 1, 4, n.3 (listing cases 
overruled by Winthrop, including those authored by Judge Queenan). 
25 In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d at 74. 
26 In re Taffi, 96 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that by adopting fair market 
value as the valuation methodology when a debtor retains and uses its property, the court 
“put this circuit in harmony with all other circuits, except the Fifth, that have considered 
the question.”). 
27 See, e.g., In re Sharon Steel Corp., 159 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (using 
liquidation value where “any hope of recovery in excess of liquidation value from the 
Debtor’s assets is minimal”); In re Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 B.R. 177, 186 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (using liquidation value where “there is not a reasonable chance of 
reorganization”). 
28 Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 962 (1997). 
29 Id. at 961. 
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held that the “proposed use or disposition” prong was of “paramount 
importance to the valuation question.”30 The Supreme Court ultimately 
held that, because the Chapter 11 debtor proposed to retain collateral under 
a proposed plan, the replacement value standard “rather than a foreclosure 
sale that will not take place, is the proper guide under a prescription hinged 
to the property’s ‘disposition or use.’”31 Although Rash concerned a 
Chapter 13 case, its direction that bankruptcy courts interpret section 
506(a) to require valuation of an asset in accordance with its disposition 
or use necessarily applies to any valuation under section 506(a).32 
B. 506(a) Valuations in the Adequate Protection Context after 
Rash 
Outside of the adequate protection context, bankruptcy courts after 
Rash overwhelmingly looked to the actual value realized on assets for 
determining the value of those assets under section 506(a).33 As the court 
in SW Boston Hotel Venture held, “[t]his case is similar to Urban 
Communicators in that . . . an actual postpetition sale of a substantial 
portion of Prudential’s collateral occurred in an arm’s length 
transaction. . . . Under the rationale set forth in Urban Communicators, the 
Hotel Sale price is the best evidence of the value of the Hotel and 
establishes that Prudential was oversecured throughout these bankruptcy 
proceedings.”34 
Bankruptcy courts after Rash have likewise declined to apply 
foreclosure value in the adequate protection context when a debtor actually 
uses assets as part of a going concern.35 In Salyer, for example, the 
                                                                                                             
30 Id. at 962. 
31 Id. at 963. 
32 See In re SK Foods, 487 B.R. 257, 262 n.11 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting an attempt “to 
distinguish Rash by arguing that it involved a ‘cram-down’ provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code” because “the reasoning and holding of Rash applies” to the adequate protection 
context). 
33 See, e.g., In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 479 B.R. 210, 223 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
2012) (determining that the sale was “the best evidence of the value” of the collateral); In 
re Urban Communicators, 379 B.R. 232, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d on other 
grounds, 394 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The ‘disposition or use’ of such property was 
(and with hindsight still is) the eventual sale of that property[.]”). In re Motors Liquidation 
Co., 482 B.R. 485, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting application of a hypothetical 
liquidation value, and noting that “because the [secured creditor] did not receive control of 
the [collateral], each side, understandably, recognizes that the fair market value would not 
be the value on liquidation.”). 
34 In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 479 B.R. 210, 223 (B.A.P 1st Cir. 2012). 
35 See, e.g., Bank Rhode Island v. Pawtuxet Valley Prescription & Surgical Ctr., 386 
B.R. 1 (D. R.I. 2008); In re Savannah Gardens-Oaktree, 146 B.R. 306 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
1992) (construing section 506(a) prior to Rash in the adequate protection context and 
adopting going concern valuation for collateral to be retained and used); In re Automatic 
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bankruptcy court was asked to reject a Rule 9019 settlement that was 
premised on the secured creditor receiving contractual adequate protection 
measured against going concern value of its collateral on the petition date. 
As found by the district court on appeal, “the Bankruptcy Court did rely 
upon the “going-concern” valuation of Debtors’ collateral that were “fixed 
assets.” The Bankruptcy Court found that a going-concern sale of those 
assets “is what was intended from the outset, [and] it was the basis on 
which [creditor] had agreed to the debtor’s use of cash collateral, and it is 
the scenario that actually resulted.”36 
Likewise, in Pawtuxet, the District Court affirmed a bankruptcy 
court’s adoption of going-concern value as the appropriate methodology 
for valuing assets for adequate protection purposes. The bankruptcy court 
concluded that the “proposed disposition or use” of the assets were of 
primary importance in an adequate protection valuation “because the 
reorganizing debtor proposes to retain and use the collateral, [and] it 
should not be valued as if it were being liquidated; rather courts should 
value the collateral ‘in light of’ the debtor’s proposal to retain it and 
ascribe to it its going concern or fair market value . . . .”37 Given that the 
assets valued in Pawtuxet were used rather than sold, the District Court 
approved the bankruptcy court’s adoption of going-concern value as the 
fair market value of those assets for adequate protection purposes.38 
Similarly, bankruptcy courts after Rash likewise declined to apply 
foreclosure value in the adequate protection context when a debtor actually 
sells assets.39 As one court noted, “the evidence of the agreed value of the 
                                                                                                             
Voting Machine Corp., 26 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (for purposes of determining 
whether secured creditor was adequately protected, rejecting evidence of liquidation value 
and holding that going concern methodology is appropriate when collateral is to be retained 
and used); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1090, at 
*20-23 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Mar. 14, 2005) (unpublished) (construing section 506(a) in the 
adequate protection context, and finding secured creditor to be adequately protected based 
on real property’s going concern value in light of debtor’s proposal to retain property as a 
going concern); In re Davis, 215 B.R. 824, 825-26 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1997) (construing 
section 506(a) in the adequate protection context in light of Rash, and holding that secured 
creditor was adequately protected based on the car’s fair market value as of the petition 
date when debtor intended to retain and use the collateral). 
36 See In re SK Foods, L.P., 487 B.R. 257, 261 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 
37 Id. at 4 (quotation omitted). 
38 Id.; see also S.K. Foods, 487 B.R. at 263 (affirming Bankruptcy Court’s approval of 
settlement, which “as required by Rash, properly relied upon the going-concern value for 
those assets which were to be sold as part of the business as a going concern”); Bank 
Hapoalim B.M. v. E.L.I., Ltd., 42 B.R. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (affirming bankruptcy 
court’s utilization of an executed sale contract for valuation of sold collateral under section 
506(a) to determine whether the secured creditor was adequately protected). 
39 In re Eskim, LLC, No. 08-509, 2008 WL 4093574, at *2-4 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Aug. 
28, 2008) (unpublished) (permitting debtor to use collateral to bridge to a going concern 
sale, and finding secured creditor adequately protected given that “the court’s accepted 
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Property by the parties at the time of the respective acquisitions is the more 
persuasive evidence of value offered at trial.”40 In Pelham, the bankruptcy 
court construed section 506(a) in the adequate protection context in light 
of Rash and rejected estimated liquidation value of collateral in the hands 
of creditor given undisputed evidence that the collateral was actually used 
as part of debtor’s going concern.41 
C. Post-Timbers and Rash Holdouts 
Even after Timbers and Rash, however, some authority continued to 
default, in the absence of specific language in court order to the contrary, 
to valuing assets that were retained and used based on their foreclosure 
values for purposes of measuring the extent of any diminution in value that 
may give rise to a need for adequate protection. The first instance, a bench 
decision in the Scotia Pacific Chapter 11 cases did not mention Rash and 
relied on Judge Queenan’s construction of section 506(a) in the adequate 
protection context.42 The second instance was Colliers’ discussion of 
section 506(a) valuation methodologies, which advocated a textual 
approach to construing section 506(a) for purposes of valuing collateral 
absent specific governing language in a cash collateral order.43 
1. Scotia Pacific 
The first such holdout was a bench decision issued by Judge Richard 
Schmidt of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in the 
Scotia Pacific Chapter 11 cases on July 7, 2008.44 That case presented 
Judge Schmidt with a dispute centered along the familiar battle lines – to 
ascertain whether certain noteholders were entitled to an administrative 
claim under a cash collateral order, the bankruptcy court had to determine 
whether or not the noteholders’ collateral had diminished in value over the 
course of the case. Implicitly relying on the Queenan doctrine for valuation 
in the adequate protection context, Judge Schmidt identified the issue as 
                                                                                                             
valuation of the property depends on its being sold at a going concern value—not one of 
foreclosure”); In re Walck, No. 11-37706 MER, 2012 WL 2918492, at *2 (unpublished) 
(Bankr. D. Colo. Jul. 17, 2012) (construing section 506(a) in the adequate protection 
context and holding, in light of Rash, that secured creditor is adequately protected based 
on the fair market value of collateral projected to be earned by sale). 
40 In re Pelham Enters., Inc., 376 B.R. 684, 690-93 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007). 
41 Id. 
42 In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027, slip op. at 23–24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 7, 
2008), aff’d in part by In re SCOPAC, 624 F.3d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 2010). 
43 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37 (16th ed. 2013) (emphasis added). 
44 In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027, slip op. at 23–24 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 7, 
2008), aff’d in part by In re SCOPAC, 624 F.3d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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“whether or not their interests have been diminished.”45 In accordance 
with that doctrine, Judge Schmidt then proceeded to identify foreclosure 
value “in the hands of the creditors” as the appropriate valuation 
methodology: 
The case law suggests that the Code provision for 
protection for loss of secured creditors – the Code protects 
the loss of secured creditors’ interest in the property. With 
non-cash property, the interest that secured creditor has a 
right to is the right to foreclose. Therefore, the caselaw 
suggests that the appropriate value to protect is the 
foreclosure value of the property and not the fair market 
value of the property. Now, both sides have cited the In 
re Stembridge case out of the Northern District of Texas 
which states, even though it was reversed on other 
grounds, it states: ‘With regard to the provision of 
adequate protection, a secured creditor is entitled to have 
his interest protected against diminution by reason of the 
estate’s ongoing possession and use of creditor’s 
collateral. The interest of the secured creditor is properly 
valued from the secured creditor’s perspective. In other 
words, the secured creditor must be protected such that 
the total realizable from its collateral through foreclosure 
does not decrease as a result of the delay imposed by the 
bankruptcy case or the enforcement of its rights.46 
Judge Schmidt went on, however, to conclude that even applying a fair 
market valuation methodology, the creditors’ interests had not diminished 
in value: 
In fact, there’s been no evidence as to a decline in the 
foreclosure value of the case, but even looking at the fair 
market value, the evidence showed that from filing to 
confirmation, the forests grew so that there are more 
trees. . . . However, despite the increase in the forests and 
the decrease in the discount rate, the Court believes that 
the value of the forests has remained relatively constant 
since the filing.47 
                                                                                                             
45 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
46 Id. at 22-23. 
47 Id. at 25-26. 
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In fact, the next day Judge Schmidt clarified that the conclusion reached 
in his bench ruling relied on both foreclosure value and fair market value, 
on alternate grounds.48 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that fair market value would be the 
appropriate methodology, but declined to reverse because the Bankruptcy 
Court’s alternate holdings meant that its statements with respect to 
foreclosure value did not constitute legal error: 
In general, when valuing a secured claim under 11 U.S.C. 
506(a)(1), fair-market value is the appropriate 
measure . . . The Bankruptcy Court’s ruling from the 
bench belies the argument that it looked exclusively to 
foreclosure value . . . [Fair-market value] is the proper 
comparison, and no legal error occurred.49 
Thus it appears that the Scopac bench ruling’s decision concerning the use 
of foreclosure value is of questionable precedential value going forward.   
2. Colliers on Bankruptcy 
Colliers on Bankruptcy constituted the second authority to advocate, 
in the absence of specific language in a cash collateral order, the adoption 
of foreclosure value even in the “retain and use” context notwithstanding 
Rash. It does not, however, advocate in support of Judge Queenan’s 
conclusion that the “creditor’s interest” in the first sentence of section 
506(a)(1) requires the adoption of foreclosure value. Instead, Colliers 
argues – without any case support – that the inclusion of the term 
“purpose” in the second sentence of section 506(a) requires the adoption 
of foreclosure value in the adequate protection context.50 
As an initial matter, when the assets to be valued are sold, Colliers 
agreed with Judge Queenan that the actual fair market value received for 
the sold asset should be determinative of their value even in the adequate 
protection context. According to Colliers: 
[b] Value of Property Disposed of by Sale. Before 
addressing the application of section 506 in contexts other 
than the one presented in Rash, it is important to point out 
                                                                                                             
48 See Brief of Appellees Mendocino Redwood Co. and Marathon Structured Finance 
Fund L.P. at n. 19, In re SCOPAC, et al., No. 09-40307, 2010 WL 4601367 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(“Now, keeping in mind I compared the amount you’re getting for what I thought was fair 
market value, I mean I think the test would be the amount you’re getting compared to 
foreclosure value. But I didn’t hold them to that.”). 
49 In re Scopac, 624 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2010). 
50 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37 (16th ed. 2013) (emphasis added); 
see also id. at ¶ 506.03[4][a], at 506-22. 
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that, regardless of the purpose of the valuation, if an 
actual sale (or equivalent disposition) is to occur, the 
value of the collateral should be based on the 
consideration to be received by the estate in connection 
with the sale, provided that the terms of the sale are fair 
and were arrived at on an arms-length basis.51 
But when the assets to be valued are to be retained and used (and not 
sold), Colliers endorsed the adoption of foreclosure valuation 
methodology, notwithstanding Rash’s emphasis on the actual “use” of 
such assets. Specifically: 
As explained in the legislative history to section 361, the 
purpose of the adequate protection requirement is to 
protect the creditor from loss occasioned by the Debtor’s 
use, sale or else of the collateral while attempting to 
liquidate or reorganize. The value to be protected is thus t 
the value of the creditor’s current interest viewed from the 
perspective of equivalent value 
 . . .  
Selecting the creditor’s hypothetical use as the 
appropriate benchmark for resolving the valuation 
question mirrors the purpose of adequate protection. 
Selecting the creditor’s hypothetical use best ensures that, 
if the debtor does not pay the secured claim, the secured 
creditor will be able to receive the same value that the 
creditor would have received if the secured creditor had 
exercised its enforcement rights against the collateral. It 
is not realistic to assume that the secured creditor will be 
able to recover from the collateral any higher value based 
on the debtor’s use of the collateral if the debtor is not 
able to reorganize or liquidate in such a way as to obtain 
that higher value 
 . . .  
                                                                                                             
51 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[6][b], at 506-37 (16th ed. 2013) (emphasis added); 
see also id. at ¶ 506.03[4][a], at 506-22 n.60 (“Of course, if the collateral is actually sold 
during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings or pursuant to a confirmed plan, the 
consideration received from the sale will almost always resolve the question of value.”); 
id. at ¶ 506.03[4][a][i]. 
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Accordingly, for adequate protection purposes, the better 
view is that the value of the collateral should be 
determined in accordance with a hypothetical foreclosure 
sale method. In applying that method, it is appropriate to 
deduct any applicable costs of sale in arriving at the 
ultimate value.52 
IV. IN RE RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC 
The Residential Capital Chapter 11 cases featured litigation over 
precisely this issue. Over the course of their Chapter 11 cases, the ResCap 
Debtors used, pursuant to a consensual cash collateral order, 
approximately $600 million of cash collateral.53 As is typical, that order 
entitled those bondholders to adequate protection claims to the extent of 
any diminution in value of that collateral.54 Critically, the order did not 
specify one way or another the proper standard for measuring such 
diminution in value. Moreover, the Debtors had retained and used and sold 
the assets at issue over the course of the ResCap chapter 11 cases.55 
The ResCap Debtors commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the noteholders’ adequate protection claims had 
no value because there had not been any diminution in value.56 For 
purposes of determining whether the secured lenders’ collateral 
diminished in value, the ResCap debtors argued that the Bankruptcy Court 
must adopt a valuation of the noteholders’ collateral based on its value in 
the event of a hypothetical foreclosure. They did not base their argument 
on Judge Queenan’s construction, instead relying on Colliers’ point that 
the “purpose” language in the second sentence of section 506(a) required 
the adoption of foreclosure value when valuing assets in the adequate 
protection context.57 
                                                                                                             
52 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 506.03[7][a][ii] (16th ed. 2013). 
53 Proposed Findings of Fact of the Ad Hoc Group of Junior Secured Noteholders and 
UMB Bank, N.A. at ¶ 173, In re Residential Capital, LLC, et al., No. 12-12020 (MG) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013), ECF No. 137. 
54 Final Order under 11.U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363(c), 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 
364(d)(1) and 364€ and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 4001, and 9014 (I) Authorizing Debtor to 
Obtain Post-Petitions Financing, (II) Authorizing Debtor to Use Cash Collateral, and (III) 
Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties (“Dip Financing Order”), In 
re SCOTIA Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 5, 2008). 
55 Id. 
56 First Amended Complaint to Determine Extent of Liens and for Declaratory 
Judgment, In re Residential Capital LLC, et al., No. 12-12020 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 
19, 2013), ECF No. 8. 
57 Adv. Pro. 13-01343, ECF 134 (Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law) at 42-43. 
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The secured lenders, on the other hand, argued that the fair market 
value of their collateral on the petition date—not the hypothetical 
foreclosure value of those same assets in the hands of their collateral 
agent—was the appropriate valuation methodology to apply for assets that 
are not turned over but rather are retained and used by a debtor, consistent 
with Timbers and Rash.58 
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court declined to adopt the “hands of the 
creditor” valuation methodology.59 The bankruptcy court relied on Rash 
and rejected the Queenan interpretation of section 506(a): 
In calculating the value of the lender’s secured claim, the 
Court looked at the first sentence of section 506(a) and 
observed that the phrase ‘value of such creditor’s interest’ 
did not explain how to value the interest. Therefore the 
Court looked to the second sentence of 506(a) and held 
that ‘the proposed disposition or use’ of the collateral is 
of paramount importance to the valuation question. Based 
on the proposed disposition of the property in that case, 
the Court held that foreclosure value could not be the 
proper methodology for valuing the secured creditor’s 
claim. Rather, the court applied replacement value, the 
amount a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller 
for the collateral. Although this case involves the 
consensual use of cash collateral in the context of a sale 
under chapter 11, the reasoning of Rash is equally 
applicable here.60 
The bankruptcy court issued its ruling in light of its making a factual 
finding that the “proposed disposition or use” of the assets to be valued 
was always to be the use of such assets by the debtors to bridge to a going 
concern sale—not to turn the assets over to the noteholders for 
foreclosure.61 
V. CONCLUSION 
ResCap recognized that Rash finally rejected Judge Queenan’s 
interpretation of section 506(a) in the adequate protection context. 
Moreover, by declining to elevate the significance of the “purpose” 
language in the second sentence of section 506(a) above that of “proposed 
                                                                                                             
58 Adv. Pro. 13-01343, ECF 138 (Defendants’ Proposed Conclusions of Law) at 35-36. 
59 In re Residential Capital, LLC, et al., 501 B.R. 549, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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disposition or use” in the second sentence of that section, the bankruptcy 
court refrained from endorsing Judge Queenan’s judicial philosophy. 
Implicit in ResCap’s holding is the textual recognition that, absent 
language in a cash collateral order specifying one way or the other, the 
“default” interpretation recommended by the Plaintiffs and Colliers would 
have overstated and distorted the true meaning of the “purpose” language 
in section 506(a) in the adequate protection context. According to Colliers, 
on the other hand, the “purpose” of adequate protection is singular – that 
is, it is always intended to protect the secured creditor on account of its 
contractual right to foreclose as a result of the imposition of the automatic 
stay. 
ResCap’s holding is consistent with the text in the Code itself. A 
careful review of the “purpose” behind the Bankruptcy Code’s adequate 
protection provisions reveals that the concept is intended to accomplish 
different objectives depending on its context, i.e., the “purpose” of 
adequate protection in the context of a secured creditor’s lift stay motion 
under section 362 differs significantly from the “purpose” of adequate 
protection in the context of a Debtors’ use of collateral under section 363. 
And in the absence of any contractual language, when a secured creditor 
never moved to take possession of its collateral, and where a Debtor never 
sought to turn over its assets, the “purpose” of adequate protection should 
not be to protect a creditor’s foreclosure value but rather to ensure that it 
is not economically prejudiced from the debtors’ use of that collateral. 
Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code neither defines “adequate 
protection” nor identifies its intended “purpose.”62 Indeed, section 361 is 
not operative but rather tracks other Code provisions.63 And while the 
legislative history of section 361 refers opaquely to the need to assure a 
secured creditor of the “benefit of its bargain,” it provides no guidance as 
to whether that benefit consists only of a creditor’s immediate right to 
foreclosure or rather its right not to be prejudiced by the Debtors’ 
affirmative use of its collateral post-petition.64 To the contrary, the 
legislative history for section 361 specifically provides that the “purpose” 
                                                                                                             
62 11 U.S.C. § 361 (“When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 
364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be 
provided by . . . ). 
63 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (requiring adequate protection when a creditor moves to 
lift stay under section 362), with 11 U.S.C. § 362(2) (requiring adequate protection when 
a debtor seeks to use creditor collateral). 
64 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 339 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295 
(“[T]hough the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of the section is 
to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained for.”). 
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of adequate protection in certain contexts is to protect something higher 
than foreclosure liquidation value.65 
With no statutory or congressional guidance, bankruptcy courts 
routinely conclude that the “purpose” of adequate protection under section 
361 differs depending on whether adequate protection is sought under 
section 361(1) or section 361(2)—i.e., the “purpose” of providing 
adequate protection to compensate for the Debtors’ use of collateral under 
section 363 (as opposed to compensating for the imposition of the stay 
under section 362) encompasses something other than just ensuring the 
creditor of its right to immediate foreclosure.66 
The differing “purposes” of adequate protection when compensating 
for the use of collateral under section 363 as opposed to the imposition of 
the stay under section 362 was directly addressed in In re Alyucan 
Interstate Corp.67 In that case, a secured creditor moved to lift the stay to 
take possession of its collateral.68 The bankruptcy court noted that while 
adequate protection under section 362 is intended to protect a creditor 
“from any impairment in value attributable to the stay,” under “sections 
363 and 364 the answer would be [to protect] from any impairment in 
value attributable to the use, sale, or lease or grant of a lien on the interest 
of property.”69 The court found the secured creditor to be adequately 
protected, and explained: 
Some cases have interpreted adequate protection more in 
terms of contractual benefits than economic values. They 
have focused on language in the legislative history 
suggesting that secured creditors must receive the ‘benefit 
of their bargain.’ H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 339 (1977). Congress, however, was not referring to 
the contractual bargain between creditors and debtors 
                                                                                                             
65 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840 (“Neither is 
it expected that the courts will construe the term value to mean, in every case, forced sale 
liquidation value or full going concern value.”). 
66 See, e.g., In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(adequate protection is designed “to safeguard the secured creditor from diminution in the 
value of its interest during the Chapter 11 reorganization”); In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790, 
804 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (“The purpose of adequate protection is to assure that the 
lender’s economic position is not worsened because of the bankruptcy case.”); In re 
Hollins, 185 B.R. 523, 528 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995) (“Adequate protection seeks to protect 
a creditor from an [sic] decline in the value of its collateral . . . .”); see also Harvey R. 
Miller & Martin J. Bienenstock, Adequate Protection in Respect of the Use, Sale or Lease 
of Property, 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 76 (1984) (“Generally, going concern value is most 
compatible with rehabilitation cases.”). 
67 12 B.R. 803, 808 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 808, n. 11a (citing to section 361). 
66 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:47 
 
because the next portion of the House Report 
acknowledges ‘there may be situations in bankruptcy 
where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his 
bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the 
bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section (Section 361) 
recognizes the availability of alternate means of 
protecting a secured creditor’s interest. Though the 
creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose 
of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives 
in value essentially what he bargained for.70 
The long term impact of the Residential Capital ruling with respect to 
the interpretation of section 506(a) remains unclear. As an initial matter, 
parties are always free to agree on language in a cash collateral order 
specifically memorializing one type of valuation standard or another. 
There is no reason to think that such language would not be respected to 
the extent subsequently challenged in court. 
Absent such specified language in the governing court order, it 
appears that the ultimate fate of the asset at issue is dispositive for purposes 
of the appropriate valuation methodology to be adopted by the Court. 
Adoption of a foreclosure valuation methodology, for example, may make 
perfect sense – and would be consistent with Timbers and Rash – to the 
extent that the actual use or disposition of such assets was a foreclosure 
for the secured lenders. In this sense, Residential Capital merely ratifies 
what many bankruptcy courts have previously recognized – that, post-
Rash, the default standard for valuing an asset is in accordance with its 
actual disposition or use. But in extending the Rash valuation default 
analysis to the adequate protection context, it appears that Residential 
Capital has rendered obsolete the last remaining authority adhering to 
Judge Queenan’s now-defunct default standard that required in all 
circumstances, regardless of the actual use of collateral, the adoption of a 
foreclosure valuation standard for purposes of applying section 506(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
                                                                                                             
70 Id. 
